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Abstract—Maintaining a resilient computer network is a deli-
cate task with conflicting priorities. Flows should be served while
controlling risk due to attackers. Configuration is time intensive
and largely static until a major new vulnerability forces change.
Tools exist to check network reachability (Khurshid et al., NSDI
2013) and risk using (probabilistic) attack graphs (Sheyner et al.,
IEEE S&P 2002). However, these tools are not designed to fashion
configurations that simultaneously satisfy multiple properties.
We introduce FASHION: a linear optimizer that fashions
network configurations that balance functionality and security
requirements. FASHION formalizes functionality as a multi-
commodity flow problem with side-constraints. FASHION’s pri-
mary technical contribution is formulating an approximation
of network risk that can be solved using a binary integer
program. The approximation linearly combines two measures.
One measure is the impact of the set of nodes the attacker can
reach in the attack graph (ignoring probability). The second is
the maximum probability path in the attack graph.
FASHION is evaluated on data center networks. The evaluation
synthesizes attack graphs on the fat tree topology with up to
128 hosts and 81 network devices. FASHION usually outputs a
solution in under 10 minutes, allowing response to short term
changes in functionality or security. Solutions are monotonic for
all observed experiments: as one increases weight on the security
objective, the actual risk, as evaluated by a probabilistic attack
graph analysis, never increases.
FASHION outputs a set of software-defined networking rules
consumable by a Frenetic controller (Foster et al., ICFP 2011).
FASHION allows an enterprise to automatically reconfigure their
network upon a change in functionality (shift in user demand)
or security (publication or patching of a vulnerability).
I. INTRODUCTION
Network configuration is an impossible job. While it may
be possible to satisfy all functional requirements, network en-
gineers are also tasked with securing the network. To carry out
their job, engineers rely on network appliances to assess the
network state (load, good and bad data flows, congestion,...)
and public vulnerability databases and security appliances to
assess the presence of risks within applications hosted on the
network. They have to integrate both sources to assess the
overall risk posture of the network and decide how to mitigate
unacceptably high risks.
(Probabilistic) Attack graphs are one way to address the first
question [1] and are used to assess the risk posture. An attack
graph is a labeled transition system that models the capabilities
that an adversary has on hosts within a network and how
those can be elevated by transitioning to new states via the
exploitation of vulnerabilities (e.g., a weak password, a bug
in a software package, the ability to guess a stack address,...).
The attack graph can be used to discover the paths that an
adversary may use to escalate his privileges to the point where
he can compromise a given target (e.g., customer database
or an administrator account). Estimations of the probabilities
of success along paths coupled with the value of the targets
characterize the risk assumed by the network owner [2], [3].
Deciding how to mitigate risk is more delicate. While
modern attack graphs can issue recommendations that indicate
which edges are most critical [2], [4]–[7] (which exploits
should be patched, where a firewall must be stood up, etc...) to
decrease the overall risk in the network, they do not account
for the loss in functionality (i.e., the collateral damage) that
they induce. In the extreme, a complete risk averse operator
can fully air gap their network, providing full protection
from outside threats at the expense of service delivery. Thus,
the recommendations may not be worthwhile, feasible or
economically sound. Furthermore, recommendations must be
implemented manually increasing response time.
A more desirable scenario to cope with emerging threats is:
1) A security appliance identifies a problematic flow/user
(signaling a change in a component’s risk) or a new vul-
nerability is published in a NVD (National Vulnerability
Database) [8], [9],
2) An attack graph is generated,
3) Recommendations derived from the resulting graph, and
4) Recommendations are programmatically deployed and
implemented
The challenge to deliver this vision is threefold: first, the
size of attack graphs grow quickly and are expensive to
(re)generate; second, attack graphs ignore functionality re-
quirements and; third, it is unclear how to quickly and trans-
parently deploy recommended changes.
A. Our contribution
To address the deployment challenges, we focus on soft-
ware defined networks (SDN) and recommendations that can
be implemented through control APIs of SDN controllers.
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For concreteness, we evaluate our approach on data-center
networks which frequently use virtualized networking [10].
The primary technical contribution of this paper is a holistic
optimization framework we call FASHION for Functional and
Attack graph Secured HybrId Optimization of virtualized
Networks. FASHION considers both functionality and security
when deciding how to configuration the network. The func-
tional layer is a multi-commodity data flow problem that routes
the flows while respecting capacity. The primary technical
contributions are in the security layer:
1) A measure that approximates the risks as modeled
by attack graphs. This approximation, which relies on
linear programming, delivers quick calculation of risk
on related networks. There are two attack graph rep-
resentations whose size may differ by an exponential
factor. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
analysis on the smaller representation that is amenable
to optimization. We discuss the distinction between the
two representations in the next paragraph.
2) A solver that uses the desired network flows, network
structure and the risk of individual components to cal-
culate a deployment of network assets and security
measures that optimizes both function and risk. The
model for the linear and integer programming solver
focuses on reconfiguring the network. Its output is fed
to a tool which creates a high-level SDN controller
implementing the configuration. Specifically, FASHION’s
output interfaces with a Frenetic controller [11].
A major problem in attack graphs is their scalability [12],
[13] as they consider all paths an attacker could take to achieve
their objective. Two common graph representations are an
attack dependency graph and an attack state graph. In the
dependency view each node represents an exploit or capability
in the network. The main drawback of the dependency repre-
sentation is that analysis of overall risk is difficult. The second
representation is the attack state graph. In this representation
each node represents an attacker’s current capabilities. This
representation simplifies analysis; however, an exponential
blowup in representation size makes it prohibitively expensive
for moderate size networks [13], [14].
Several works have used optimization to create attack graph
recommendations [2], [15]. To the best of our knowledge, there
has been no analysis of attack dependency graphs which is
conducive to repeated evaluation on related graphs (differing
by the introduction of a defensive countermeasure or a new
flow). Our developed risk measure is an approximation of a
prior measure described by Wang et al. [16] (described in
Sec. III) and consists of a weighted sum of two parts:
Reach:The total impact of the nodes that are reachable
by the attacker. This translates to an attack graph
where each nonzero probability edge is assumed
to be compromised. The first generation of attack
graphs considered this measure [17]–[21].
Path: The risk (impact*likelihood) of the maximum path in
the network. Prior work by Khouzani et al. [3] used
this measure in attack state graphs (see Section II).
Looking ahead to the evaluation (Section V), we use Wang et
al.’s algorithm as ground truth for the evaluating the security
of our resulting configurations. In all generated instances our
metric of avg(Reach,Path) is monotonic in Wang et al’s
algorithm (which is far too slow to be used in an optimization).
FASHION usually outputs a configuration in under 10 minutes,
allowing response to short term events (on networks with 128
hosts and 81 networking devices).
B. Limitations
FASHION is not applicable for all networks at all times.
FASHION is not an “add on” to the existing infrastructure of
a legacy system. However, the landscape is shifting towards
SDN controlled data centers which provide the flexibility and
programability required [22].
FASHION requires full integration and control over network
configuration. While a human could review the proposed
configuration before implementation, such an interface would
likely require an explanation engine that provided supporting
evidence for changes being made. FASHION can provide
evidence of optimality but converting this to a human inter-
pretable form is future work.
Furthermore, there are barriers to adopting attack graphs.
Major criticisms of attack graphs include the difficulty finding
the necessary inputs [23], [24], the difficulty in implementing
the output recommendations [25], and scaling issues. Indeed,
to implement the attack graph recommendation, it is necessary
to interpret their output, a task deemed too difficult and too
remote from the network to be actionable [26]. FASHION
is designed to address this problem. Scalability remains a
limitation (further discussion in Section VI). The size of attack
graphs is a weakness, driving the time it takes to generate
and analyze them. The evolution of networking environments
towards SDN provides the perfect opportunity for integration
with attack graphs. SDN offers a centralized control and
holistic view of the network no longer requiring external
scanning tools to discover reachability data [27].
C. Driving Example
This section describes a toy example that is used to illustrate
the concepts used throughout the paper. Recall that the objec-
tive of the framework is to produce a collection of decisions to
configure the network devices (routers, firewall, ...) to serve the
functional requirements while minimizing the risks incurred
by the network. In this work we consider routing decisions on
flows only (including blocking a flow).
We assume white list routing where only desirable flows are
carried to their destination. This corresponds to all extraneous
flows in the network already not being severed. The primary
reason for this decision is that it places FASHION in the region
where there is a sharp tradeoff between functionality and
security. If one has an attack graph that routes using flows that
are not necessary to functionality, this routing can be disabled
at no cost to functionality. Furthermore, we assume devices
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src → dst type value
0 → 3 A $$$
3 → 4 A $
3 → 4 B $
3 → 5 A $$
3 → 5 B $
5 → 6 A $$
TABLE I
FLOWS IN EXAMPLE NETWORK IN FIGURE 1.
Precondition post prob
(3,0: A) (3,1) 0.50
(5,0: A) (5,1) 0.50
(6,0: A), (5,1) (6,1) 0.50
(4,0: B), (3,1) (4,1) 0.50
TABLE II
EXPLOITS IN THE NETWORK IN FIGURE 1.
can use source routing which allows more flexibility in our
security decisions and ability to respect capacity.
Figure 1(a) illustrates the physical layer of the network. The
following conventions are used:
• circle are routers
• square are hosts
• black lines are physical connections (wires)
It features 3 SDN appliances, nodes 0, 1 and 2 that route traffic
as well as block it (act as firewalls). The toy network features
4 hosts, 3 through 6. This mini network can support different
paths between the SDN appliance 0 and any host (e.g., host
3). For example, 0→ 2→ 3 and 0→ 1→ 3.
This physical network must be configured to serve traffic
demand. Table I shows a collection of data flows in the form
s→ t conveying that traffic emanating from node s must reach
node t. Each data flow has a type (here A or B). Each data
flow also carries an economic value shown by the number of
$ signs.
Unfortunately, hosts in this network have vulnerabilities.
Table II shows four exploits. Each exploit has one or more pre-
conditions to be triggered as well as effects and a probability
of succcess. A pair (h, p) states that the adversary secured
capability p on host h where the ordered set of capabilities is
{0, 1}. Privilege level 0 represents the ability to send traffic
to that host, it is augmented with the traffic type (either A or
B).
Figures 1(b)-1(d) show possible outputs of the framework,
i.e., a configuration that defines routing tables for each SDN
appliance (including explicit firewalls). In this network con-
figuration, the following conventions are added:
• gray nodes are routers that are blocking traffic
• black (resp. blue) arrows are type A flows (resp. B)
• dashed arrows represent blocked traffic
Figure 2, conveys the attack graph for this network. For
instance from having capability 0 on host 0 (the entry point)
one can transition to having capability 0 on host 3 (host 3 is
reachable from SDN device 0). The red diamond node exploit
0 shows that exploiting the vulnerability on host 3 will deliver
a privilege escalation, i.e., capability 1 on host 3. On this
simple toy example the attack graph is a directed acyclic graph
and all exploits are assuming to be exploitable with probability
1. FASHION’s full model does not include either assumption.
Figure 2 uses the following conventions:
• square nodes represents the entry point of the network
• green square NET nodes represent network reachability
• diamond nodes are exploits
• circle nodes are (host,privilege) states.
• black (resp. blue) arrows correspond to network connec-
tion of type A (resp. B)
• incoming red links are precondition states of exploits
• outgoing red links are postcondition states of exploits
Figure 1(b) shows a configuration resulting from FASHION
in which the objective was exclusively the maximization of
the functional objective (total flow). All data flows are served
and no counter-measures are deployed, leaving the network
exposed to an adversary as shown by the existences of paths
that reach the target nodes (6, 1) and (4, 1) (in Fig. 2).
Alternatively, Figure 1(c) conveys a configuration at the
opposite end of the spectrum where security is paramount. The
attack graph in Figure 2 shows that the easiest way to block
access to the 4 exploit nodes is to sever the edge b (0 → 3).
Indeed, if one cannot reach host 3, exploit 0 is not usable
and the hosts 4 and 5 are unreachable preventing the attacker
from leveraging exploits 1 through 3. In Figure 1(c) node 0
is now blocking all traffic of type “A.” In this configuration,
the internal traffic proceeds unabated. However, the high
“commercial” value of flow 0 → 3 was not respected doing
great damage to the economic value of the network service.
This solution may be acceptable if the security of the internal
resources greatly outweighs the external network reachability.
In some settings, though, this extreme focus on security at the
expense of functionality may be uncalled for.
Finally, Figure 1(d) brings us to an interesting trade-off
where the interplay between competing priorities become
apparent. In this solution, the flow 0→ 3 is served because of
its intrinsic economic value while edges e and d in the attack
graph (corresponding to routing 3 → 4 : B and 3 → 5 : A
respectively) are turned off. More precisely, these flows are
routed to node 2 which is a firewall for both traffic types
as shown in Figure 1(d) This is done to prevent the attacker
traversing edges h and i and then being able to use exploits
1, 2, 3. This unconventional placement of countermeasures
prevents an adversary from reaching the capability nodes (6, 1)
and (4, 1) while still preserving the most valuable functional
part of the network. To gain additional insight into why edges
e and d (flows 3→ 4 : B and 3→ 5 : A) are turned off note
that in Table II (4, 0 : B) and (5, 0 : A) are preconditions for
3 of the 4 exploits in Figure 2. This combined with the value
of flows in Table I makes these the right edges to cut. The
sacrifice made to the adversary is accepting the risk of him
reaching host 3 and securing elevated privilege 1 on that host.
Organization The organization of this work proceeds as
follows. We introduce the most relevant related work in
Section II. Section III introduces background on attack graphs
on the measures we will optimize over, Section IV documents
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(a) Physical network topology. (b) Functionality configuration (c) Security configuration (d) Balanced Configuration
Fig. 1. Output of optimization model on sample network when considering functionality only, security only, and both. The set of required flows is shown
in Table I, the exploits in Table II and the corresponding attack graph in Figure 2. Figure 1(a) shows the set of available network links that can be used by
the optimization framework. Figure 1(b) shows the output of the model when considering only functionality requirements, Figure 1(c) shows the output when
considering only security requirements, and Figure 1(d) shows a solution respecting both requirements.
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Fig. 2. Attack graph for network in Figure 1
the optimization model, Section V evaluates FASHION, and
Section VI concludes.
II. RELATED WORK
Researchers have proposed high-level SDN programming
languages in order to efficiently express packet-forwarding
policies and ensure correctness when dealing with overlap-
ping rules [11], [28]. These languages focus on parallel
and sequential composition of policies to ensure modularity
while providing correctness guarantees. Importantly, when our
framework proposes a set of new rules for the controller it is
necessary to ensure that good traffic is not lost [29].
To aid in network configuration, research tools assess net-
work reachability [30], network security risk [31], [32], and
link contention [33], [34]. Note that these tools assess the
quality of a configuration with respect to a single property
and do not provide recommendations.
Our work can be seen as unifying two recent works, one by
Curry et al. [35] and another by Khouzani et al. [3]. Curry et al.
proposed an optimization framework for deciding on a network
configuration based on the given desired network functionality
of data flows and the underlying physical network. Curry et
al. showed how to produce a network configuration that meets
all demands while blocking adversarial traffic. In their model,
each network node has an input risk and nodes assume a
fraction of the risk of any node with which they share a
path. However, their risk measure does not take into account
network structure or the ability of an adversary to pivot in the
network.
Khouzani et al. [3] created an optimization engine designed
to minimize security risk as represented by an attack graph.
They show how to formulate the most effective attack path
of an attack graph using a linear program. Their functionality
view is limited to imparting an explicit numeric functional
cost to each remedial action. It is unclear how to create these
input costs used in the model or what to do if the functional
requirements are non-linear. Importantly, Khouzani et al.’s
formulation requires attack state graph. In practice, attack
state graphs are exponential in the size of the network, as
each set of capabilities is a distinct node [14]. Our Path mea-
sure also measures the maximum likelihood path. However,
since our measure operates on an attack dependency graph it
4
corresponds to a slightly different property. We discuss this in
Section III.
Two primary areas for improvement clearly emerge. First,
it is desirable to integrate realistic functionality concerns
directly into the decision making process. Second, a novel
risk measurement that simultaneously allows optimization and
a tractable attack graph is needed.
III. ATTACK GRAPHS
FASHION’s goal is to balance the functionality and secu-
rity needs of the network. Functionality needs are relatively
straightforward to state: a set of desired network flows that
should be carried in the network while respecting link capacity.
Security is more complicated to state. We use the abstraction
of attack graphs.
Attack graphs model the most likely paths that an attacker
could use to penetrate a network [1], [18], [20], [36]. In the
attack graph model attackers traverse the network to reach
their target(s) network resource. This traversal may combine
traditional network capability such as routing with exploitation
of a software/hardware vulnerability. An attack graph assumes
an attacker starts at some entry point such as a publicly facing
Web page and through a series of privilege escalations and
network device accesses pivots to eventually reach his or
her desired destination. (The technology supports an arbitrary
starting point if one wishes to consider insider attacks.) We
focus our discussion here on attack dependency graphs as
defined by Homer et al. [37]. Another common type of graph is
called an attack state graph. We discuss the distinction between
these two data structures in Section III-A. For brevity, we just
refer to attack dependency graphs as attack graphs.
There are two types of nodes in an attack graph: capa-
bilities, denoted C, and exploits denoted as ex. An exploit
requires some number of capabilities as preconditions. If an
attacker has successfully obtained those preconditions they are
assumed to gain all successors of ex with some probability.
Example capabilities include ability to send packets, user level
authority, root level authority. Example exploits include an
SQL injection which requires an ability to send packets and a
SQL server running a specific software version. A successor
of this exploit node may be root level access on the device
running the SQL server. In the attack graph in Figure 2, when
an attacker executes Exploit 0, they achieve privilege level 1
on node 3 with some probability.
Building an attack graph requires network reachability in-
formation, device software configurations and known exploit
information [8], [9], [38], [39] to generate the graph. Attack
graphs are only effective in measuring how an attacker would
traverse using known vulnerabilities and system state. While
it is possible to consider the implications of a new vulnerabil-
ity [5] this is not a native capability.
In isolation a misconfigured device which allows unautho-
rized access may be benign but when coupled with network ac-
cess to ex-filtrate data or pivot to additional targets the results
can be devastating. The goal of constructing and analyzing
an attack graph is to understand the security posture in total.
An attack graph should allow one to understand defensive
weaknesses and critical vulnerabilities in the network. Since
all enterprises have limited budgets, the goal of this analysis
is usually to prioritize changes that have the largest impact.
A. The size of attack graphs
Since their introduction, a major problem in attack graphs is
their scalability [12], [13]. They consider all paths an attacker
could take to achieve their objective. There are two very
different ways of representing the graph that are called an
attack dependency graph and an attack state graph. In the
dependency view each node represents an exploit or capability
in the network. It may be possible to achieve a capability using
many different paths. Furthermore, multiple conditions may
be necessary to achieve this capability, for example, network
reachability of a database machine and a SQL injection attack.
This is the view presented in Figure 2.
In the most general form, each exploit has an associated
Boolean structure (indicating when the exploit can be ob-
tained) and a probability (indicating attacker success rate
in carrying out the exploit). Capability nodes are annotated
with an impact value that signifies the cost of an adversary
achieving that capability (following the NIST cybersecurity
framework guidance [40]). In this work, we focus on exploits
that are AND and OR prerequisites (and not arbitrary Boolean
formulae). Note the dependency representation may have
cycles. The main drawback of the dependency representation
is that analysis of overall risk is difficult. Even if one assumes
that probability associated with each edge is independent,
calculating the overall probability requires consideration of all
paths, and there may be infinite paths from the starting point to
a target if the graph has cycles. We return to this problem after
describing the state representation and prior work on quickly
evaluating attack graphs on similar enterprises.
The second representation is the attack state graph. In
this representation each node represents an attacker’s current
capabilities. Suppose there are k capabilities in the network.
In the state representation, there are 2k nodes representing
whether the attack currently has each of the capabilities
1, ..., k. In the dependency representation, the attack graph
has k capability nodes and some number of exploit nodes.
This representation is acyclic and makes it very easy to carry
out analysis [14]. However, an exponential blowup in repre-
sentation size makes it prohibitively expensive for moderate
size graphs [14]. Khouzani et al’s model [3] requires the state
representation to minimize risk.
B. Evaluating related attack graphs
In this work we focus on the ability to repeatedly evaluate
an attack graph on related networks. The ability to perform
this analysis quickly is critical to utilizing attack graphs in our
optimization framework. The ability to regenerate the attack
graph multiple times at decreased cost has been addressed
recently in related contexts.
Almohri et al. [41] considered an attack graph setting where
the defender has incomplete knowledge of the network. An
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example source of this uncertainty is mobile device movement.
They then construct attack graphs using a probabilistic model
which includes the uncertainties in network configuration. In
our setting, we are trying to find the best configuration under a
variety of settings, Almohri el al. would be appropriate if the
functionality and security requirements could not be unified as
it could provide recommendations under a variety of related
functional settings.
Frigault and Wang [42] argue that it is inaccurate to measure
probabilities with a fixed probability of exploit. They argue
that factors such as patches being available will decrease the
threat while wide spread distribution of vulnerability details
may increase the threat. As such, they conduct attack graph
analysis where the graph is static but probabilities can change
over time. Poolsappasit et al. [7] also argue that the probability
of attack success changes over time.
Note that if one is willing to consider a complete attack
graph then all changes in the graph can be represented with
a change in probability. However, this is akin to considering
the state representation as one needs to consider an edge from
each subset of nodes.
To the best of our knowledge, Khouzani et al.’s work
is the only work that considers defensive actions that can
drastically change the attack graph and a formulation of
the risk calculation graph that is amenable to optimization.
However, their model is inherently tied to the state graph
representation.
C. Formalizing the problem
In this subsection, we define the risk measure that we
take as our ground truth when evaluating FASHION’s output.
Our metric is drawn from Wang et al. [16] augmented with
impact for each node. Wang et al.’s metric assumes an attack
graph where the probability of achieving each exploit is
independent. Since paths in an attack graph often overlap,
the probability of achieving prerequisites of an exploit may
not be independent. This simplifying assumption is frequently
used because considering correlated probabilities makes the
problem significantly harder [37]. We note that our derived
metrics use only edge probabilities (see Section III-D), so one
could evaluate our results using a risk metric that does not
assume independence. Consider the following notation:
• Let EX be the set of all exploits.
– Let EXn be the network reachability exploits (to
model the underlying dynamic network) and EXv be
the set of vulnerability exploits, EX = EXn ∪ EXv.
– Let EXAND be the set of AND exploits and EXOR be
the set of OR exploits, EX = EXAND ∪ EXOR.
– We assume that EXn ⊆ EXOR. Network reachability
is treated as OR considering the possibility of several
traffic types between network hosts.
– Exploit nodes, ex ∈ EX, are augmented with a
probability p(ex) that represents the probability of
carrying out the exploit assuming all prerequisites
have been satisfied. This probability can be estimated
using vulnerability databases [8], [9], [38]. Note that
p(ex) is a component metric, we seek to capture
the cumulative risk in the network (see discussion
in [16], [43]).
• Let C represent the set of all capabilities in the underly-
ing network. Capabilities nodes are augmented with an
impact Pact : C→ R+ ∪ {0}.
• Define a node set N = EX ∪ C.
• Then the edge set E is the union of two sets:
– Rr ⊆ C × EX which represent the prerequisites
needed to achieve an exploit.
– Ri ⊆ EX × C which represent the new capabilities
yielded by achieving an exploit.
That is E = Rr ∪ Ri. Note that there are no edges in
C× C or EX× EX.
• An attack graph G is a directed graph, G = (N,E).
• Let Start ⊆ C denote a set of capabilities that the
adversary is believed to have.
For any node n we use Pred(n) to denote all of its predeces-
sors in the graph, {v|(v, n) ∈ E}, and Succ(n) to denote all
of its successors in the graph, {v|(n, v) ∈ E}.
Having defined the graph itself we now consider the overall
risk that we wish to compute. We start with a description of
how to compute overall risk in the absence of cycles and then
consider cycles. Our discussion follows heavily from Wang
et al.’s [16] methodology. Their formulation is centered on
Bayesian inference, we augment their model with an impact
for each capability node.
Our primary goal is to compute cumulative scores P (ex)
and P (c) for each node in the graph, these nodes represent
the likelihood that an attacker reaches the specified node in
the graph.1 If these scores are calculated one may consider
overall risk as:
Risk(G) =
∑
c∈C
P (c) ∗ Pact(c) (1)
The remainder of this section is dedicated to how to compute
P (·). We start by considering the acyclic case and then
consider cycles. For AND exploits, the cumulative score is the
product of all predecessors and p(ex). For OR exploits, the cu-
mulative score is the sum of all predecessors component score
minus the product of each pair of probability scores (using
Bayesian reasoning). All capability nodes are treated as OR
nodes. For a set X , we define the operator Bayes : X → [0, 1]
as:
Bayes(X) =
{∑
X′⊆X (−1)|X
′|+1∏
x∈X′ p(x) X 6= ∅
0 X = ∅ .
Definition III.1 (Network Risk). [16, Definition 2] Given an
acyclic attack graph G and any component score assignment
1It is possible to assign individual component scores p(c) for nodes c ∈
C. In this work we assume that p(c) = 1 for all c ∈ C. We assume that
all uncertainty in the attacker’s success is represented in exploit edges. This
choice is not crucial for any of our modeling and is done to simplify notation.
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function p : EX −→ [0, 1] , the cumulative score function P :
EX ∪ C −→ [0, 1] is defined as
P (ex) =
{
p(ex) ·∏c∈Pred(ex) P (c) ex ∈ EXAND
p(ex) · Bayes(Pred(ex)) ex ∈ EXOR
P (c) =
{
1 c ∈ Start
Bayes(Pred(c)) otherwise.
Note that P (n) can be computed for all n ∈ N as
long G is acyclic. P (n) can be computed once its P (e)
is known for all e ∈ Pred(n). Thus, there exists at least
one topological ordering that allows this computation (and all
topological orderings result in the same computation). For a
given acyclic attack graph let algorithm ARisk(G) compute
P (ni) for ni ∈ N .
Handling Cycles We now turn to Wang et al’s [16] adaption of
the above risk formulation that handles cycles. This metric will
be used to evaluate our security measures which are introduced
in the next subsection (Section III-D). Wang et al. make the
following observations. [16]:
1) Cycles with no entry point can be safely ignored and all
nodes can be set to 0 likelihood.
2) We only need to measure the probability of an attacker
reaching a node for the first time. Thus, consider a cycle
with only one incoming edge, denote by n the node
with the incoming edge. We can safely compute P (n)
without considering the cycle as any path that traverses
the cycle will have already included n. Thus, the cycle
edge returning to n can be ignored.
3) The difficult case are cycles with multiple entry points.
These cannot be easily handled by removing an edge
from the graph. The key observation here is no path
that an attacker traverses will actually follow the cycle.
Different paths will include subsets of edges from the
cycle.
Wang et al. propose the following methodology for handling
cycles with multiple entry points [16]. This methodology as-
sumes that all nodes that can be topologically sorted have been
and their cumulative probabilities assigned. Let X represent
a cycle with at least two entry points. The key observation is
that for each entry point x ∈ X we can compute P (x) without
considering Succ(x). While x’s successors are important in
calculating the overall risk they do not impact P (x). So we can
compute a new attack graph G′ which has all Succ(x) removed
and use this to calculate P (x). Importantly, the graph G′
may still have cycles which inhibit computation of P (x) but
this process can be performed recursively. Once this recursion
terminates it is repeated for all entry points in the cycle. Once
all entry points have their likelihood computed, the rest of the
cycle can be safely evaluated and ARisk can continue.
Note that some parts of the computation can be reused
throughout the recursion (all nodes that were sorted before
the cycle was encountered) but the likelihoods computed in
this process for x′ 6= x are not the true likelihoods and cannot
be reused between recursive steps.
We have implemented this algorithm that computes this risk
recursively through cycle removal. When we use the term
Risk(G) we are referring to this metric. As mentioned above,
we will evaluate the output of our model with respect to
Risk(G). As we discuss in Section V this algorithm is not
nearly fast enough to be incorporated into an optimization
framework that is considering many possible solutions. The
implementation is in Python and has been open-sourced along
with the rest of FASHION [44].
D. Approximating Risk
In order to incorporate cumulative risk into an optimization
framework, we turn to approximations of risk that can be
linearized. The risk calculation presented in Definition III.1
and its augmentation for handling cycles is non-linear. To the
best of our knowledge, even a closed form of the calculated
value is not known. We consider two approximations to
serve as proxies. After introducing these approximations, we
remark on the strengths and weaknesses of both of these
approximations and why they complement each other well.
We defer to Section V to remark on quality of our measures.
We call these two approximations Reachability and Max
attack. The qualitative differences in the two approximations
may make either measure (or a combination) appropriate for
a given set of network parameters (scale of network, traffic,
pattern, vulnerabilities).
Reachability Instead of using the raw probability of ex-
ploitation, we binarize them.
P ∗(n) =
{
1 P (n) > θ
0 P (n) ≤ θ
The value θ is a threshold used to determine whether a
capability should either be ignored or considered attained.
We consider θ = 0. Since p(n) ∈ {0, 1}, we can apply
standard Boolean linearization techniques to get a tractable
representation of dynamic risk.
Reach(G∗)
def
=
∑
c∈C
P ∗(c) ∗ Pact(c) (2)
Utilizing the binary representation of exploits in Equation 2
is an approximation, measuring how an attacker can impact a
target network. Since we consider θ = 0 this measures the total
impact of nodes reachable by the adversary. This is equivalent
to calculating the weighted size of the connected components
in G that contains Start. The first generation of attack graphs
did not consider annotate nodes with probability and measured
this quantity [18], [45]. This models the worst case approach
when calculating attacker compromise of network capabilities
and assumes that the all vulnerabilities with probability of
exploitation above a threshold will be successfully exploited.
However, this approach does have a weakness when the goal
is to jointly optimize functionality and security. Consider two
nodes a and b where Pact(a) = 2∗Pact(b). Further suppose, at
least a or b must remain in the connected component to satisfy
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functionality demands. The reachability metric will prioritize
disconnecting b. However, it may be that the attacker is less
likely to reach b and this decision is not optimum. This may
be the case even if p(b) ≥ p(a) (it is possible that P (a) >
P (b) even in this case due to the likelihood of reaching their
predecessors).
Max Attack The second risk measurement we introduce is
the attacker’s most likely course of action. This measure is
based on Khouzani et al.’s most effective attack measure [3].
We introduce the measure first and then say how our approach
differs from Khouzani et al. [3].
Let s be the attacker’s starting point in the attack graph.
We define ωσ→c to be the set of all paths, where a path is
sequence of edges (e1, . . . , ek) such that ei ∈ E, from σ to c
in the attack graph. Let Λc ∈ [0, 1] be the normalized impact
of an attacker obtaining capability c. Then the most effective
attack path is defined as follows.
Path(G) = max
c∈C
Λc max
ωσ→c
∏
e∈ωσ→c
p(Pred(e)) (3)
Instead of having multiple targets, an auxiliary target µ
is considered, that will be the sole target capability of the
attacker. To do this, edges from each c ∈ C to an auxiliary
exploit exc are introduced, such that p(exc) = Λc. Then we
introduce an edge from each exc to µ. Doing this, we can
reformulate equation 3 as:
Path(G) = max
ωσ→µ
∏
e∈ωσ→µ
p(Pred(e)) (4)
However network defenses can be deployed in order to reduce
the probabilities of these exploits. Let xd ∈ {0, 1} be a binary
decision variable denoting whether a network defense d has
been deployed. Let pd(ex) be the reduced probability of exploit
ex due to network defense d. With this, the probability of
exploit ex with respect to network defense decision xd is given
by
pxd(ex) = p(ex)(1− xd) + pd(ex)xd. (5)
Therefore we want to minimize the risk due to the most
effective path risk over all the possible configurations of
network defenses available. This approach identifies appro-
priate locations to deploy network defenses in order to protect
both high value capabilities with low exploitablity as well as
lower value, more exploitable assets. We will incorporate these
defense decisions when defining our optimization model in
section IV.
Path(G) follows closely to Khouzani et al.’s most effective
attack. Note that Path does not distinguish between a graph
with 2 paths with the same underlying probability and a single
path with that probability. In addition to this inaccuracy (that
was present in Khouzani et al.’s work) working on the attack
dependency graph introduces two sources of error:
1) Path only counts the impact from the last node on the
path. This is because it is only measuring the probability
of a path and the impact is added as a “last layer” in
the graph. So it doesn’t distinguish between two paths
(of equal probability) where one path has intermediate
nodes with meaningful impact. In the attack state rep-
resentation each node has the current capabilities of the
attack and thus impact of this node set can be added as
a last layer.
2) The path used to determine Path may not be exploitable
by an adversary due to AND nodes. That is, the path
may include a node with multiple prerequisites and the
measure only computes the probability of exploiting
a single prerequisite. In the attack state representation
there are no AND nodes so this problem does not arise.
Balancing Reach and Path. As described above both Reach
and Path have inherent weaknesses. We believe (and demon-
strate in Section V) that FASHION outputs better solutions
when considering both metrics. We call the weighted sum
of these two functions Hybrid. This is because Reach and
Path mitigate each other’s weaknesses. However, even a joint
optimization over both metrics is still heuristic.
Reach is effective at isolating nodes that don’t need to
communicate. However, when there is a tie between two nodes
that could be excluded, Reach may not make the right decision
because it does not know the likelihood of reaching these
nodes. However, Path’s measure can effectively break ties on
which node to remove based on the maximum likelihood path
that reaches the node.
Path is effective at isolating nodes that have a high prob-
ability path to them. Yet, this measure does not account for
the other nodes compromised “on the way” to the target node.
By minimizing the total weighted reachable set using Reach
this weakness is partially mitigated. Similarly, if two paths
have similar probability but one contains multiple AND pre-
requisites, it may have a larger reachable component, enabling
Reach to again break ties.
IV. OPTIMIZATION MODEL
This section highlights the content and structure of the
optimization model used to obtain network configurations
that uphold a balance between functionality and security. The
detailed model can be found in Appendix A.
The optimization model is a binary integer programming
(BIP) model as all decision variables are binary. The model
contains two components dedicated, respectively, to the mod-
eling of the data network and its job as a carrier for data flows
and to the representation of the attack graph and the modeling
of induced risk measures Reach and Path. The core decision
variables fall in two categories.
First, Boolean variables modeling the routing decisions
of the data flows in the network are associated to network
links and subjected to flow balance equations as well as link
capacity constraints that capture the valid delivery of flows and
the functional rewards associated to those deliveries based on
the flow values.
Second, Boolean variables associated to the deployment
of counter-measures in the network. In this work, counter-
measures are routing a flow to a firewall (rather than its
destination). Auxiliary Boolean variables are introduced to
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facilitate the expression of the model and setup channeling
constraints that tie the attack graph model to the network
routing model so that routing as well as blocking decisions
are conveyed to the attack graph side and result in severing
arcs that express pre-conditions of exploits.
While the constraints devoted to capturing reachability, i.e.,
Reach, are relatively straightforward, the modeling of the most
effective path, i.e., Path is more delicate for two reasons. First,
it requires the use of products of probabilities held in variables
yielding a non-linear formulation. Thankfully, that challenge
can be side-stepped by converting those products into sums
with a logarithmic transform. Second, it delivers a min−max
problem that needs to be dualized to recover a conventional
minimization.
The objective function combines (linearly) two linear ex-
pressions capturing the functional objective and the risk ob-
jective. Both are weighted with a parameter α that allows
the model user to play with the risk-functionality trade-off.
Namely, the objective is of the form minα ·Of + (1−α) ·Os
where Of is the functional objective and Os is the risk
objective.
The risk objective Os is itself a linear combination of three
components:
Od The cost of the security measures
β1 · Or The weighted Reach risk
β2 · Op The weighted Path risk.
Notably, using β1 = 0, β2 = 1 delivers a model that exclu-
sively consider Path as its risk measure while β1 = 1, β2 = 0
focuses exclusively on the Reach risk measure. Without loss
of generality, let β = β1 and β2 = 1 − β with β ∈ [0, 1].
The parameterization gives a hybrid risk measure based on a
convex combination of Path and Reach. Two key parameters
of the optimization models are, therefore, α and β that control
the functionality-risk tradeoff and the balance between Path
and Reach measures.
V. EVALUATION
In this section we show the efficacy and efficiency of
FASHION. The goal is to understand 1) does FASHION produce
configurations that effectively balance functionality and secu-
rity? and 2) does FASHION produce configurations quickly?
what time scale of events can FASHION respond to?
A. Experimental Setup
To the best of our knowledge, no standard benchmarks for
attack graphs exist. For the purpose of this paper, we created a
benchmark suite with instances that model a general case sce-
nario for data center topology, traffic patterns and utilization
rates along with a realistic representation of dispersed network
vulnerabilities. A high level breakdown of the benchmark
characteristics can be found in Table III. The evaluation is
made on a Linux machine with an Intel Xeon CPU E5-2620
2.00 GHz and 64GB of RAM. In total we generated more than
500 instances.
Network Topology The generated instances are of the popular
Clos [46] style network topology Fat-tree [10] and are repre-
sentative of a cloud data center. Fat-tree features an expanding
pod structure of interconnected and tiered switches providing
excellent path redundancy. The topology is designed to deliver
high bandwidth to many end devices at moderate cost while
scaling to tens of thousands of hosts. Following Fat-tree’s
economy of scale approach, switch and link capacities in
all benchmarks are 1GBps. The benchmarks include small to
medium sized instances. The largest instance we test includes
128 hosts, 81 switches and 400 links between devices.
Network Traffic Network demand is modeled after the recent
Global Cloud Index (GCI) report [47] which provides a global
aggregated view of data centers. The benchmarks include two
distinct traffic patterns: Internal at 70% and External at 30%
(by combining GCIs Inter-data center 15% and Internet 15%).
Research shows that there exists heavy-tailed distributions for
the volume and size of data flows [48]. There are generally
small (1Mb-10Mb) and large (100Mb-1Gb) sized flows with
90% of the traffic volume being small and 10% large [49], all
benchmarks follow this distribution.
Each flow is randomly labeled with a traffic type
to account for the range of traffic in DCNs such as
HTTP,HTTPS,SMB... [50]. One-third of the instances have 1
traffic type, one-third of the instances have 2 traffic types and
the one-third of instances have three traffic types. Each flow is
assigned a flow value at random from the set {1, 2, 3, 5, 25}.
Finally, Network utilization is impacted several factors such
as time of day [51], or application distribution [52], [48].
The number of flows per host is varied across benchmarks
with steps {1, 3, 5, 10} to generate the variation in network
utilization.
As an illustrative example of the benchmark generation
process consider a 54 host instance with 10 flows per host.
This results in 540 total flows. Each flow is first randomly
assigned as internal (70%) or external (30%). Next, the source
and destination are randomly selected, two distinct hosts for
internal or one host and the Gateway router for external. (Note,
the Gatway is the demarcation point between the network and
the Internet) Each flow is then assigned a size, traffic type
and value based on the distributions provided above. Finally,
each flow is duplicated reversing the source and destination to
represent two-way traffic.
Vulnerabilities Synthetic vulnerabilities are injected on hosts
within the network. The generation adopts several components
from the vulnerability model presented the recent CVSS
3.1 Base metrics focusing on exploitability and impact [8].
The instances select a percentage of hosts as exploitable
hosts ranging in {10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%} and the average
number of vulnerabilities per vulnerable host (1-5) which
drive the total number of vulnerabilities injected. The number
of vulnerabilities per host is representative of Zhang et al’s
findings [53] from scans of publicly available VMs after
patching was performed.
Each vulnerability is assumed to have one or more prereq-
uisite conditions, a random probability of exploitation and a
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Network Topology Network Traffic Vulnerabilities
pod Hosts Switch Links #traffic #flows Exploits AG edges
min max min max min max min max
2 4 6 9 1 3 8 80 1 10 18 165
4 16 21 52 1 3 16 160 1 40 258 2350
6 54 46 171 1 3 54 540 5 108 2928 26463
8 128 81 400 1 3 128 1280 12 250 16422 147627
TABLE III
BENCHMARK DATA. THE NUMBER OF LINKS REPRESENTS THE NUMBER OF BI-DIRECTIONAL LINKS IN THE NETWORK. THE #TRAFFIC COLUMN
REPRESENTS THE NUMBER OF DISTINCT TRAFFIC TYPES.
single post condition of privilege escalation (if successfully
exploited). Three privilege levels {0, 1, 2} are assumed with 0
denoting networking reachability.
With probability 50% each generated exploit has a single
precondition, 25% probability to have 2 preconditions and
25% probability to have 3 preconditions. Procedurally, the
single precondition exploits are generated at random from
selected exploitable hosts, each allowing the escalation of a
single step in privilege level. If the required number of single
precondition exploits exceeds the number of exploitable hosts
additional hosts are infected. The multi-precondition exploits
are generated by selecting one prerequisite randomly from the
pool of existing (single precondition) exploits and generating a
new exploit which increases the privilege of one of the input
exploits, the other prerequisites are selected randomly from
the current set of achievable capabilities.
The impact of a successful exploit is reflective of value
of the threatened asset. We uniformly assigned each host a
integer Pact value from [1, 100]. The value to an attacker
is a percentage of the asset’s value that depends on the
privilege secured by the attacker on that host. The quantities
[10%, 20%, 50%] are used as the scaling factors for the three
privileges {0, 1, 2}.
B. Results
We organize our results discussion around answering the
two questions introduced in the beginning of Section V: does
FASHION produce good configurations and does it do so in a
timely manner? Answering the first question is slightly delicate
because our security optimization is using Reach and Path
instead of using Risk. Throughout this section we only report
on the security quality of the final configuration with respect
to Risk. The algorithm for computing Risk is too slow to use
in the optimization model but allows an effective check on
the quality of the solution (see Section V-B3). In all of our
results the functionality score is the normalized value of the
delivered traffic. That is, we consider the total value of traffic
delivered when α = 1 (corresponding to the optimization
considering only functionality) as functionality score of 1,
the rest of functionality scores are normalized by this value.
Similarly, we normalize Risk in the same way, computing the
Risk value when α = 1 (no protections deployed) and use
this as the denominator for other configurations. Note when
α = 1 this corresponds to a baseline Risk for all tradeoffs of
the security model. This is because the β parameter and the
cost of countermeasures are not included in the model.
1) Does FASHION produce good configurations?: Sec-
tion III-D argues that combining the two security models
would produce better configurations than having β = 0 or
β = 1. This was confirmed in our experiments. In Figure 3
we show a representative instance’s solution set for varying
α and β. Setting β = 1 produced a meaningful tradeoff
between functionality and security. However, when we con-
sider 1 > β > 0 in the Hybrid manner the solution quality
is improved (e.g., α = .7 improves functionality without
impacting security). In all analyzed solutions, varying α with
just the Path measure active (β = 0) produced solutions that
varied Path but not the actual Risk (other than blocking the
gateway).
Thus, the setting of β ∈ (0, 1) seems crucial, but the par-
ticular value within (0, 1) does not seem to have a substantial
effect on solution quality. This would be the case if one
model is primarily being used as a tie-breaker for the other
model. However, we cannot rule out that different settings of
β would be preferable on different classes of networks and
attack graphs.
For the remainder of our analysis we consider β = .5
corresponding to Path and Reach having the same weight in
FASHION. Using this setting of β = .5 we now ask if FASHION
produces solutions that trade off between functionality and
security. As a reminder, we use whitelist, source routing in
this work so setting α = 1 corresponds to the minimum risk
that is achievable while routing all desirable flows (assuming
routing all flows is feasible within bandwidth constraints).
Any further minimization of risk necessitates decreasing func-
tionality. Furthermore, since we consider an external attacker,
blocking all flows at the entry point is always the solution
chosen when functionality is not considered (optimizing over
only risk). Thus, every instance has functionality and risk of
0 when α = 0. We remove this point from all analysis and
consider α > 0.
Recall that FASHION is approximating Risk using Reach
and Path so its possible for a decrease in α to lead to worse
risk and functionality. However, in all of our experiments,
risk and functionality were both monotonic for steps of α
of size .1.2 We consider 212 benchmarks of pod size of 6,
each having 54 hosts. Varying α for each benchmark we plot
both the functionality scores against α and also the risk scores
against α. The functionality and risk scores are normalized as
previously stated. Figure 4 demonstrates the probability mass
2We did observe small perturbations that violated monotonicity if one
considered steps of α of .01.
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Fig. 3. Solution set for representative instance. Each dot represents a different value of α, β. As α decreases FASHION increases weight of security model
and decreases weight of functionality model. Setting β = 1 corresponds to only using Reach in the security model. Setting β = 0 corresponds to only using
Path. Values β ∈ (0, 1) correspond to using both models.
functions of every instance solution varying α = .1 to α = 1
in steps of .1.
Note that the functionality scores across all benchmarks are
relatively stable for α ≥ .1 while the risk scores vary sig-
nificantly. Importantly, at every point on this curve FASHION
is computing and outputting a corresponding network config-
uration. Note that in addition to considering what flows to
include, the solution also describes how to route flow in a
way that respects (and load balances) switch capacity. Based
on visual inspection we classified our instances into three types
of attack graphs.
Instances with the most area under the curve It seems
common in such instances for nodes with exploits to serve as
an endpoint in many of the desired flows. In one generated
pod 4 attack graph, a node with an exploit was the end point
for a flow from 11 of the 15 other hosts. “Disconnecting” this
node from the network required sacrificing many flows. This
makes the functionality versus security tradeoff sharp. Note
such a graph can occur in practice when many clients need to
access a critical resource such as a database.
Instances with the least area under the curve It seems
common in such instances for flows with high value to be
mostly distinct from exploitable nodes. In one instance with
98 total flows, it is possible to achieve risk 0 by only blocking
15 flows. Such instances can be seen as easy: the risky nodes
are not crucial to functionality.
Instances with many tradeoffs It seems common in such
instance to have exploitable hosts that have a meaningful but
not overwhelming value of flow. In these cases, FASHION can
mitigate risk in two ways: by severing external connections
to prevent an attacker from entering the network, or by sev-
ering internal connections to prevent an attacker from moving
laterally through network.
To illustrate this scenario and the corresponding choices,
we consider one pod 4 attack graph with four exploitable
nodes. These four nodes are all involved in both external and
internal flows. Here the external flows were typically of higher
value than that of internal flows, making FASHION sacrifice
the internal flows for the sake of security at larger values
of α. However as α decreases, external flows begin to be
blocked which allows for previously severed internal flows
to be serviced once again, as they are no longer needed to
prevent lateral movement since the attacker cannot necessarily
enter the network through external gateways. Table IV shows
the balance of external and internal flows blocked in this
instance. In this instance, the larger sets of blocked internal
flows at smaller values of α were not supersets of smaller
sets of blocked internal flows seen at larger α values. This
demonstrates an important capability of FASHION: the ability
to recognize defenses whose current marginal cost (to func-
tionality) exceeds their value (to security).
α .9 .8 .7 .6 .5 .4 .3 .2 .1
External Flows Blocked 0 1 3 5 5 7 7 48 48
Internal Flows Blocked 3 11 11 15 15 23 23 0 0
TABLE IV
NUMBER OF EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL FLOWS BLOCKED OVER VARYING
VALUES OF α ON EXAMPLE INSTANCE.
2) Does FASHION produce configurations in a timely man-
ner?: To verify the scalability of FASHION and its ability to
react to short term events, it is valuable to assess performance
as a function of various input size parameters. Experiments
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Fig. 4. Probability mass function of instances for normalized risk (top left) and normalized functionality (top right). Start of bar represents min, widening
at 10% and 25% with a line at 50%, reducing width at 75% and 90%, stopping at the max for each value of α. Note in all cases risk is 0 when α = .1.
Normalized risk (bottom left) and functionality (bottom right) for every pod 6 benchmark.
were done on Fat-tree networks with pod sizes 6 and 8. For
each size, the number of flows per hosts and the number of
exploits per host were increased to assess the impact on the
runtime. Figure 5 shows the model solve times when scaling
the number of exploits, while Table V shows the model solve
times when scaling the number of flows per host. Two key
observation emerge. First both the number of hosts and flows
contribute significantly to the time. This is not surprising as
the amount of hosts and flows increase the sizes of both the
network and the attack graph, resulting in a large increase
to the model size. A second observation is that the number of
exploits alone can also cause a rise in solve time, as it directly
affects the size of the attack graph. Yet, the volume of exploits
does not have as dramatic impact as the number of hosts/flows.
That is sensible as the number of exploits does not affect the
size of the network. That is, increasing flows and hosts effects
both functionality and security size while increasing exploits
only effects security model size.
These evaluations show that for networks of up to 128
hosts affected by a substantial number of flows and exploits,
the framework produces optimal configurations within 3-7
minutes. In comparison to related work only considering
attack graphs, Ingols et al. [5] build a non-probabilistic attack
graphs for networks with nearly 40,000 hosts; they can output
reachability of targets in approximately 2 minutes. Homer et
al. [37] build probabilistic attack graphs on networks with
100 hosts, their attack graph generation takes between 1-46
minutes depending on the complexity of the exploit chains.
Both prior works generate attack graphs for static network
configuration with no consideration of the routing problem.
Ingols et al. group hosts in equivalence classes which
can be done in our model as well. Naturally, placing nodes
in equivalence classes creates a scalability versus fidelity
tradeoff.
FASHION’s response time (on networks of this scale) allows
automated response to short term events. It would take human
network engineers at least this amount of time to identify a
valid solution and mitigate risk, let alone one that is provably
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Fig. 5. Solve Time of FASHION in seconds for Pod 6 and Pod 8 Networks with Different Numbers of Exploits with α = .7.
pod 6 8
#flows per host 3 5 10 3 5
min 13.24 25.28 65.55 152.74 497.91
25% 16.68 38.87 120.47 215.86 656.25
50% 19.82 43.12 151 260.6 827.22
75% 23.33 53.36 201.56 309.04 1410.95
max 87.73 289.66 2316.20 607.36 2787.03
average 22.27 57.1 219.18 276.41 1178.08
TABLE V
SOLVE TIME IN SECONDS FOR POD 6 AND 8 NETWORKS WITH DIFFERENT
FLOWS PER HOST WITH α = .7
optimal. In an actual deployment, where the model must be
solved repeatedly over time as inputs slightly evolve, the
runtime can be drastically reduced when resolving the model
by priming the optimization with the solution of the previous
generation [54], [55].
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Fig. 6. Risk calculation time for output of FASHION on pod 8 instances.
Calculation using Python implementation of Wang et al.’s algorithm [16].
Pod 8 instances correspond to 128 hosts and 81 switches.
3) Can Risk be directly used?: Figure 6 shows the time
required to compute the actual Risk, with α = .7 and using our
Python implementation of the algorithm by Wang et al. [16] of
the network configuration output by FASHION. The instances
considered use 128 hosts, with 12 to 250 vulnerabilities. Over
this set of benchmarks, the computation time for the risk
values in a fixed configuration can reach 100 seconds for 250
exploits. The time to evaluate the actual risk seems correlated
to the number of exploits, and the evaluation algorithms start to
struggle even with a relatively small number (e.g., 50 exploits).
The search space associated with this kind of problem is
generally huge (more than billions). Consequently, using this
algorithm specification of Risk would likely yield a highly
non-linear formulation that are prone to being intractable in
practice. Reverting to an enumeration of configurations and
computing the risk a posteriori would be obviously intractable
given even the fastest runtime cost (outlined above) that
would be incurred at each leaf. Linearization is essential to
deliver a responsive and practical framework to assist network
administrators.
VI. CONCLUSION
Configuring Software Defined Networks to maximize the
volume of customers data flows to and from servers while
respecting device and link capacities is a classic flow op-
timization problem. Protecting such a network from adver-
saries attempting to exploit vulnerabilities that plague specific
devices and hosts is equally important to address within
organizations. Attack graphs are effective in modeling risk and
finding mitigations (defensive measures). Unfortunately, risk
and functionality are antagonistic objectives and optimizing
one without caring for the other is unhelpful as it will deliver
extreme solutions that are impractical. This paper consid-
ers both challenges in a holistic fashion and automatically
computes new SDN configurations for network devices in
response to emergent changes in demand, component risk
or exploit discoveries. The FASHION framework models the
customer demands, network devices and link capacities. It also
captures two notions of risk, Path and Reach under an attack-
dependency graph model within the overall optimization. The
output from FASHION includes routing decisions for SDN
devices as well as firewall mitigation decisions.
The paper demonstrates that FASHION can explore the
trade-off between functionality and risk. As stated, FASHION
optimizes over both objectives but the model can easily be
converted into one where either security or functionality is a
constraint and the other objective is optimized. The average
of Path and Reach is an effective linearizable stand in for
a risk calculation that is prohibitive to compute on the scale
needed for a configuration search problem. Interestingly, the
novel hybrid risk model enables FASHION to overcome their
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respective weaknesses and produce better solutions. From
a practical angle, FASHION runs in matter of minutes on
networks of reasonable size (128 hosts) and demonstrates po-
tential for scalability. Finally, the empirical results indicate that
the approximation adopted by FASHION does not jeopardize
key properties such as monotonicity of functionality vs. risk.
The FASHION framework delivers a first step towards
handling both functionality and risk for short-term response
while producing consistent results with natural interpretations.
Future directions include addressing not only source-routing
but also destination routing within the network; handling
scalability of the model size that currently depends on the
number of network edges as well as the number of data flows;
supporting a more varied set of controls beyond routing and
blocking.
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APPENDIX
A. Full Model Description
In this section we describe the optimization model used to
obtain network configurations that uphold a balance between
functionality and security. For functionality we model multi-
commodity network flow and tie functional success to the
delivery of flows in the network. For security we consider both
the cost of deploying network defenses and the risk present
based on known exploits, end-to-end network connections, and
an attacker’s traversal through an attack graph created for the
network. In particular, we utilize two different metrics for
approximating network risk:
1) an attacker’s reachability of nodes in the attack graph
(based on Equation 1)
2) the most effective attack path present in the attack graph
[3]
In mixed integer programming, the four primary components
are Inputs, Variables, Constraints, and an Objective function.
These are listed below.
Inputs
R – the set of SDN devices (routers/firewall).
H – the set of hosts (machines) on the network.
G ⊂ R – the set of external gateway devices in the network.
D = R∪H – the set of all network devices.
L ⊂ D ×D – the set of all network links.
T – the set of traffic types.
F – the set of tuples (h, k, t) ∈ D × D × T defining desired
traffic flows of type t from source device h to sink device k.
s∗ – an artificial node in the network used as the global
source of all flows.
t∗ – an artificial node in the network used as the global
destination of all flows.
σ – an artificial node in the attack graph used as the global
starting point of the attacker.
C – the set of capabilities an attacker could gain on devices
in D.
Start – the set of starting capabilities for an attacker.
EXn – the set of exploits based on network connections.
EXv – the set of exploits based on network vulnerabilities.
EXAND – the set of AND exploits.
EXOR – the set of OR exploits.
EX = EXn ∪ EXv = EXAND ∪ EXOR – the set of all exploits.
Q(l) : L → R – the capacity of link l.
K(i) : R → R – the capacity of network device i.
τ(f) : F → T – yields the traffic type of flow f .
τ(ex) : EXn → T – yields the traffic type of network exploit
ex.
p(ex) : EX → [0, 1] – the probability of success for a given
exploit.
δ−(i) : D → 2D – the set of vertices with outbound arcs
leading to vertex i.
δ+(i) : D → 2D – the set of vertices with inbound arcs
originating at vertex i.
Pred(n) : N → 2N – set of the predecessors of n in the
attack graph.
Succ(n) : N → 2N – set of the successors of n in the attack
graph.
src(f) ∈ D – the network device source of flow f .
dst(f) ∈ D – the network device destination of flow f .
q(f) : F → R – the quantity of data attributed to flow f .
val(f) : F → R – the value of flow f .
dev(c) : C→ D – yields the device in a capability node.
dev(ex) : EXn → D – yields the destination device of a
network-connection-based exploit.
cost(l) : L → R – the cost of an arc in the network.
Pact(c) : C→ R – the impact of attack gaining capability c.
Variables
ρfi,j ∈ {0, 1} – for every f ∈ F and every (i, j) ∈ L,
indicates whether link (i, j) carries flow f .
bfi ∈ {0, 1} – for every f ∈ F and every i ∈ R, indicates
whether flow f is blocked by a firewall at network device i.
wfi ∈ {0, 1} – for every f ∈ F and every i ∈ R, indicates
whether there is a firewall filtering flow f at network device
i.
vti ∈ {0, 1} – for every t ∈ T and every i ∈ R, indicates
whether there is a firewall blocking traffic type t at network
device i.
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Wi ∈ {0, 1} – for every i ∈ D, indicates whether there is any
kind of firewall present at network device i.
N tk,h ∈ {0, 1} – for every (k, h) ∈ (H ∪ G) × H and every
t ∈ T , indicates whether there is an active network connection
between devices h and k.
βfi ∈ {0, 1} – for every i ∈ R and every f ∈ F , indicates
whether network device i blocks flow f using a firewall
specific to traffic type.
θfi ∈ {0, 1} – for every i ∈ R and every f ∈ F , indicates
whether network device i receives flow f .
rn ∈ {0, 1} – for every n ∈ C ∪ EX, indicates whether node
c is reachable from the root of the attack graph.
ai,j ∈ {0, 1} – for every (i, j) ∈ E, indicates whether edge
(i, j) is present (i.e., not cut) in the attack graph.
xi,j ∈ {0, 1} – for every (i, j) ∈ E, indicates whether an
attacker would be able to traverse edge (i, j), i.e., ri ∧ ai,j
Constraints
The first part of the model captures the networking side of
the model, including how to route flows, respect capacities of
devices and how to block specific flows.
ρs∗,src(f) = 1, ∀f ∈ F (6)
Equation 6 forcibly spawns each flow in the network at its
network machine source.
βfi = θ
f
i ∧ vτ(f)i , ∀f ∈ F ,∀i ∈ R (7)
bfi = w
f
i ∨ βfi , ∀f ∈ F ,∀i ∈ R (8)
Equation 7 model that a flow f is blocked at device i if it
reached device i and a firewall rule blocked traffic of the type
carried by f . Equation 8 is similar, but states that a flow f is
blocked if there is a firewall rule specifically designed to drop
flow f or if it was blocked by a generic firewall type rule.
θfi =
∨
j∈δ−(i)
ρfj,i, ∀f ∈ F ,∀i ∈ R (9)
Lastly, equation 9 states that a flow f arrives at device i if
one of the inbound arcs into i carries flow f .
∑
j∈δ−(i)
ρfj,i =
∑
k∈δ+(i)
(ρfi,k + β
f
i ), ∀f ∈ F ,∀i ∈ R (10)
∑
j∈δ−(i)
ρfj,i =
∑
k∈δ+(i)
ρfi,k, ∀f ∈ F ,∀i ∈ H (11)
Equations 10 and 11 are the flow balance equations that dictate
that every inbound flow must also be outbound, unless it was
blocked. The equations are slightly different for internal SDN
devices (equation 10) and hosts that are not permitted to route
traffic (equation 11).
ρfi,j = 0, ∀f ∈ F ,∀i ∈ H \ {src(f),dst(f)},∀j ∈ δ+(i)
(12)
ρfdst(f),j = 0, ∀f ∈ F ,∀j ∈ δ+(i) \ {t∗} (13)
Equations 12 and 13 states that hosts can only forward traffic
to the flow sink by preventing the use of any other outbound
arc. ∑
f∈F
(ρfi,j · q(f)) ≤ Q(i, j), ∀(i, j) ∈ L (14)
∑
f∈F
∑
k∈δ−(i)
(ρfk,i·q(f))+
∑
f∈F
∑
j∈δ+(i)
(ρfi,j ·q(f)) ≤ K(i),∀i ∈ R
(15)
Equation 14 simply models the bounds on link capacities.
Equation 15 plays a similar role for the device capacities.
Wi =
∨
f∈F
wfi ∨
∨
t∈T
vti ∀i ∈ R (16)
Equation 16 models the existence of a blocking firewall of any
kind at SDN device i.
N tk,h =
{
ρfh,dst(f) if 〈k, h, t〉 ∈ F
0 otherwise
, (17)
∀(h, k) ∈ (H ∪ G)×H,∀t ∈ T
Equation 17 models the existence of an active network
connection between devices k and h.
Attack Graph Reachability
This part of the model is devoted to the attack graph, specif-
ically which capabilities an attacker can reach. It creates
channels between variables of the networking model and
variables of the attack graph. It also models the semantics
of AND and OR nodes as well reachability within the attack
graph.
rc =
∨
i∈Pred(c)
xi,c, ∀c ∈ C (18)
rex =
∧
i∈Pred(ex)
xi,ex, ∀ex ∈ EXAND (19)
rex =
∨
i∈Pred(ex)
xi,ex, ∀ex ∈ EXOR (20)
Equation 18 models an OR node. Namely, it states that the
capability n is enable if the adversary can traverse at least
one inbound arc (coming from an exploit). Equation 19
models an AND node. Namely, it states that the exploit n is
enabled provided that all inbound arcs can be traversed by
the adversary. Equation 20 models an OR node in a similar
fashion.
xi,j = ri
∧
ai,j , ∀(i, j) ∈ E (21)
Equation 21 enables an arc (i, j) in the attack graph if its
source is reachable and the arc was not cut by ai,j .
ai,j = 1, ∀(i, j) ∈ EXv (22)
rσ = 1 (23)
Equations 22 state that arcs that are incident on a vulnerability-
based exploit x are always enabled while equation 23 states
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that the attacker’s starting point σ, which has arcs leading to
every n ∈ Start, is always reachable.
ac,ex = N
τ(ex)
dev(c),dev(ex), ∀c, ex s.t. (c, ex) ∈ E (24)
Equation 24 is a channeling constraint connecting the presence
of an network-connection-based arc in the attack graph to
reachability in the network model.
Most Effective Path
This part of the model focuses on capturing an attacker’s most
effective attack path, which is formulated in Equation 4, and
embedding it within a minimization. To model this in a mixed
integer program, we use the strategy presented by Khouzani
et al. [3]. First, we note that Equation 4 is equivalent to the
following.
max
γ
∏
e∈E
(γep(t(e)) + 1− γe) (25)
s.t. γe ∈ {0, 1} ∀e ∈ E,
∑
e:h(e)=i
γe −
∑
e:t(e)=i
γe =

1 if i = µ
−1 if i = σ
0 ∀i ∈ C ∪ EX
(26)
Here γe is a binary decision variable that indicates whether
an edge e is on the most effective attack path. Equation 28
enforces that the edges chosen will form a path from σ, the
global attack graph starting point, to µ, the global attack graph
target. Here h(e) and t(e) denote the head j and tail i of
an edge (i, j). And since the objective function maximizes
the probability of the taken path, as the product scales with
an edge’s probability if the edge is taken and 1 otherwise,
this formulation is equivalent to equation 4. However, as
written, this formulation is not linear, as there is a product
of variables in the objective function, and thus cannot be
directly incorporated into a linear mixed integer program. We
can address this concern by composing the above objective
with the monotonic function log(·).
log
∏
e∈E
(γep(t(e))+(1−γe)) =
∑
e∈E
log(γep(t(e))+(1−γe))
And considering that γe ∈ {0, 1}, the above equation can
be further simplified to
∑
e∈E
γe log(p(t(e)). With this we now
have the following optimization problem to model the most
effective attack path.
max
γ
∑
e∈E
γe log(p(t(e))) (27)
s.t. γe ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ E
∑
e:h(e)=i
γe −
∑
e:t(e)=i
γe =

1 if i = µ
−1 if i = σ
0 ∀i ∈ C ∪ EX
Now we have obtained a linear formulation for the most
effective attack path, but there is one more issue to address.
The formulation is a maximization that we will be minimizing
when synthesizing network configurations. Formulating this
problem as a min-max is not desirable, so instead of solving
the above maximization problem to find the most effective
attack path, we will instead solve its dual, which is a min-
imization problem with the same optimal solution. The dual
model is given below.
min
y
yσ − yµ (28)
s.t. yt(e) − yh(e) ≥ log(p(t(e))) ∀e ∈ E
Note that because of the ability to deploy network defenses,
we can apply log(·) to equation 5 to obtain:
log(p(t(e))) = (1− x) log(p(t(e))) + x log().
Since we apply log to the probabilities, we cannot have an
exploit with a probability of zero. Thus we use a very small
number  to model the scenario where network defenses reduce
the likelihood of an exploit to zero. In particular, this is
how completely severing host-to-host communications in the
network can cut edges incident to network reachability exploits
in the attack graph. Now that we have formulated the most
effective attack path as a minimization problem, it can be
incorporated directly into the objective function of our overall
minimization problem.
Objective
The objective function in this model is comprised of two
components, a functionality cost and a security cost. Below
we give the expression for the functionality score Of .
Of = α0
∑
f∈F
−ρdst(f),µ · val(f) + α1
∑
f∈F
∑
(i,j)∈L
ρfi,j · cost(i, j)
(29)
The first term yields a credit for routing good flows through
the network from their source to their destination and is scaled
by the assigned value of the flow. The second term describes
the cost incurred by routing flows though the network based
on the cost of the links use to carry each flow.
The security score is comprised of three pieces:
• cost of deploying network defenses
• risk due to attack graph reachability
• risk due to the most effective attack path.
The cost incurred from network defenses, Od, is below.
Od = α2
∑
i
wi + α3
∑
i
∑
t
vti + α4
∑
i
Wi
The first two terms describe the cost paid for deploying flow-
specific and traffic-specific firewalls, respectively. The third
term gives a penalty per unique network device deploying any
kind of firewall and it a way to reduce network complexity by
encouraging the concentration of multiple firewalls to a few
devices.
The risk due to attack graph reachability, Or, considers which
capabilites an attacker can reach and yields the appropriate
cost for allowing the attacker to gain these capabilities.
Or =
∑
n∈C
rn · Pact(n)
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The risk due to the most effective attack path, Op, is given by
Op = yσ − yµ.
We will denote the overall security cost Os as
Os = β0Od + β1Or + (1− β1)Op.
Note that here we can vary β1 to have the framework prefer
one risk metric over the other.
The overall objective that dictates a balance between function-
ality and security is given below.
min αOf + (1− α)Os (30)
Here we have the ability to vary α to influence the framework
to produce network configurations that favor functionality over
risk or vice versa.
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